49 DFID, “Annual Review – Summary Sheet,” CSSF North East Nigeria Conflict Management and Stabilisation, https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300309/documents.116 Paul Carsten and Ahmed Kingimi, “As Nigeria Elections Loom, Refugees Ordered Back to Unsafe Region,” R, August 20, 2018.You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers.1 Ruth Maclean, “Boko Haram Launches Series of Attacks in North-east Nigeria,” Guardian, December 28, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/28/boko-haram-launches-series-of-attacks-in-north-east-nigeria.
Boko Haram has been on the backfoot in Nigeria since the election of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015. The group once held territory equivalent to the size of Belgium in Nigeria's impoverished. In October 2015, Colombia sent a delegation of security experts to assist the Nigerian authorities and share expertise on security and counter terrorism. In January 2016, a delegation led by Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai also visited Colombia to exchange information in regards to the war against Boko Haram.
We depend on voluntary donations to run this site. Please help us to keep public figures accountable by supporting the project.In 2008, police began an investigation into the group code-named Operation Flush. On 26 July, security forces arrested nine Boko Haram members and confiscated weapons and bomb-making equipment. Either this or a clash with police during a funeral procession led to revenge attacks on police and widespread rioting. A joint military task force operation was launched in response. By 30 July more than 700 people had been killed; police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches had been destroyed.:98–102 Yusuf was arrested, and died in custody "while trying to escape". As had been the case decades earlier in the wake of the 1980 Kano riots, the killing of the leader of an extremist group would have unintended consequences. He was succeeded by Abubakar Shekau, formerly his second-in-command. A classified cable apparently sent from the U.S. Embassy in Abuja in November 2009, has been published on WikiLeaks:
On 2 April, a Boko Haram attack on the outskirts of Maiduguri resulted in the death of 18 people and another 84 wounded. This attack came just days after the government of Nigeria claimed there was a ceasefire with Boko Haram. The attack happened in the villages of Bale Shuwa and Bale Kura, close to both Maiduguri and the city's military camp.
Read about Nigeria's ongoing battle with insurgent group Boko Haram and keep track of the latest developments using the Global Conflict Tracker from the Council on Foreign Relations On 24 March 2015, residents of Damasak, Nigeria said that Boko Haram had taken more than 400 women and children from the town as they fled from coalition forces. On 27 March, the Nigerian army captured Gwoza, which was believed to be the location of Boko Haram headquarters. On election day 28 March 2015, Boko Haram extremists killed 41 people, including a legislator, to discourage hundreds from voting. Since 2009, a radical Muslim movement in northern Nigeria has become widely known in Western media for both its militant actions and its ultra-fundamentalist programme: Boko Haram, often translated as Western education is forbidden (sometimes even more misleadingly as Western education is sin). 1 Boko Haram activities have been reported not only in northern Nigeria, but also in. So far, only a small number of aid providers have initiated programs that focus on strengthening local governance in the northeast as a core objective. Most donors view the question of local government autonomy as highly complex and politically sensitive.140 There is also a risk that pushing for greater decentralization would only make monitoring corruption more challenging, particularly in the absence of effective local-level democracy.141 “Working on livelihoods and economic empowerment is much easier, because you work directly with local beneficiaries and do not have to deal with local politicians,” notes one aid official. Existing national-level democracy and governance programs have largely remained divorced from the conflict response. Many focus on strengthening electoral processes and anti-corruption institutions and supporting civil society. While donors note that these programs should eventually help address contributing causes to the insurgency, they were generally not designed with a conflict perspective in mind.
Nigeria's military raided a United Nations compound on Friday in the northeastern city at the epicenter of a conflict with Islamist insurgency Boko Haram, a UN official said The Boko Haram conflict has caused about 2.1 million people to flee their homes, with about 1.9 million currently displaced and 200,000 of these spread over Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic Boko Haram has launched its deadliest assault yet against troops in Chad. In a separate attack, the militant group killed at least 50 Nigerian soldiers in an ambush in eastern Borno state
The long-run sustainability of donor-funded dialogue platforms also remains an open question. Past programs have insufficiently accounted for longevity in their design: for example, they often operated in parallel to traditional conflict management systems, depended heavily on local political champions, and did not plan for a gradual phase-out and institutional takeover toward the end of the program cycle. It is of course possible that a donor intervention can change local perceptions, attitudes, and relationships in ways that outlive a particular platform or mechanism—however, this proposition remains largely untested to date.17 Hilary Matfess, “The New Normal: Continuity and Boko Haram’s Violence in North East Nigeria,” Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset, February 11, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/new-normal-continuity-and-boko-haram-s-violence-north-east-nigeria.
The U.S. State Department designated Boko Haram and its offshoot Ansaru as terrorist organizations in November 2013, citing Boko Haram's links with AQIM and its responsibility for "thousands of deaths in northeast and central Nigeria over the last several years including targeted killings of civilians". The State Department also cited Ansaru's 2013 kidnapping and execution of seven international construction workers. In the statement it was noted, however, "These designations are an important and appropriate step, but only one tool in what must be a comprehensive approach by the Nigerian government to counter these groups through a combination of law enforcement, political, and development efforts." The State Department had resisted earlier calls to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist group after the 2011 Abuja United Nations bombing. The U.S. government does not believe Boko Haram is currently (2014) affiliated with al Qaeda Central, despite regular periodic pledges of support and solidarity from its leadership for al-Qaeda, but is particularly concerned about ties between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (including "likely sharing funds, training, and explosive materials"). Continuing abductions of civilians by criminal groups occurred in the Niger Delta and Southeast ... Police and other security forces were often implicated in the kidnapping schemes.
[Borno political and religious leaders] ... asserted that the state and federal government responded appropriately and, apart from the opposition party, overwhelmingly supported Yusuf's death without misgivings over the extrajudicial killing. Security remained a concern in Borno, with residents expressing concern about importation of arms and exchanges of religious messages across porous international borders.On 23 March, Boko Haram fighters attacked soldiers in Boma, Chad, killing 92 and destroying 24 army vehicles. It marked the deadliest ever attack by Boko Haram on the country’s military forces, and a serious escalation of conflict. In its eight-day counter-operation "Operation Bohoma Anger", Chadian army claims to have killed around one thousand Boko Haram fighters while incurring 52 casualties of its own troops. Of 58 suspected Boko Haram members, who had been captured during the operation, 44 died in a prison in N'Djamena mid-April 2020. The Minister of Justice Djimet Arabi stated that the men died as a result of poisoning.
The militant group Boko Haram originated in Maiduguri, the largest city of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria, and has been waging war on the region for the last decade. Imag Boko Haram will be crushed in days, says Buratai, by Saxone Akhaine and Abdulganiyu Alabi, The Guardian Nigeria, March 8, 2020: As the military continues to record success in its fight against insurgents, Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen Tukur Yusuf Buratai has assured that Boko Haram will soon be a thing of the past
The World Unpacked is a weekly foreign policy podcast, hosted by Jen Psaki, that breaks down the hottest global issues of today with experts, journalists, and policymakers who can explain what is happening, why it matters, and where we go from here.A second hurdle has been the lack of civilian oversight over detention and screening facilities, and the difficulties of establishing a workable legal and policy framework for the demobilization and reintegration of Boko Haram members. Donors seeking to support the defection and rehabilitation of low-level Boko Haram members early on recognized the need for a broader policy to guide these efforts. In contrast to programs targeting community security and local governance, which at least in the short term can proceed without federal action, community reintegration depends on national guidelines that clarify who is eligible for rehabilitation and under what conditions.
A 13 million pound programme to educate 100,000 children living in the conflict zone and; implementing a Nigerian crisis response mechanism to help the government respond to incidents like terror attacks and; cutting the number of new recruits joining Boko Haram by tackling the false information spread by the group to recruit new members. Several overarching challenges have complicated local-level stabilization efforts over the past two years. Ongoing insecurity presents the most immediate challenge, particularly in Borno State. Recurring attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP as well as ongoing military operations have delayed the return of displaced populations, prolonged humanitarian crisis conditions, and made it difficult for aid organizations to reach vulnerable communities. Second, donors have struggled to work through and with the Nigerian government, whose conflict response has been plagued by weak coordination and corruption. Difficulties in locating effective counterparts create a classic dilemma for external actors: work through the government and risk bureaucratic delays and political obstruction, or bypass it to the extent possible and risk creating parallel structures that fail to strengthen host government capacity. Lastly, weaknesses in regional cooperation present another significant hurdle. From reintegrating ex-combatants to preventing farmer-herder conflicts and rebuilding rural economies, many of the issues facing the Lake Chad region require cross-border approaches. To date, coordination efforts remain largely externally driven, and progress in implementation has been slow.In 2019, the conflict in northeastern Nigeria entered its eleventh year. Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency and the government’s military response have killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced millions across the Lake Chad region, which straddles Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Although major military campaigns in 2015–2016 succeeded in degrading the group’s territorial control, Boko Haram has proven remarkably adaptable in its tactics: the end of 2018 once again saw an uptick in attacks in Nigeria’s Borno State.1 As Muhammadu Buhari assumes his second term as president, the conflict in the northeast appears far from resolved.138 Skype interview with international aid official, Adamawa, March 2018; and interview with EU diplomat, Abuja, February 2018.Boko Haram went underground for more than a year after the uprising, but re-emerged in 2010 with assassinations and a major raid on a prison. Yusuf’s deputy, Abubakar Shekau, who police claimed had been killed in the 2009 uprising, began to appear in videos as the group’s new leader.
On 1 October, villagers in Kirchinga, Adamawa complained of a lack of security personnel after 5 residents had their throats slit during an unchallenged early morning attack. The village borders Cameroon and the Sambisa forest. On 18 October the village of Dar, Adamawe was attacked. Maina Ularamu, a former Chairman of Madagali Local Government Area, stated: "A large number of gunmen invaded the village, forcing residents to flee to a nearby bush. Two female suicide bombers disguised as fleeing villagers detonated explosives in the bush where many people were hiding, killing 12 persons". On 20 October, there were reports of a military ambush in Madagali, assisted by vigilantes, in which over 30 militants were killed. On 21 October, according to vigilante reports a joint operation in Madagali and Gwoza killed 150 militants and rescued 36 captives. On 23 October, a suicide bomb at a crowded mosque killed 27 in Yola, Adamawa's capital. On 17 November, an explosion at a food market in Yola killed 32, in the first Nigerian bombing since 23 October attacks in Maiduguri and Yola. On the morning of 28 December, two female suicide bombers detonated their explosives at a crowded market in Madagali. According to a local resident, at least 28 were killed. A second theory of change guiding service rehabilitation efforts centers on citizen participation: by involving communities in decisionmaking around local services and development priorities, programs will foster greater social cohesion and government accountability, in addition to delivering positive socioeconomic outcomes.46 This approach is premised on the idea that unaccountable, top-down governance has been a key driver of conflict. Survey research commissioned by USAID for example found that across many LGAs in northeastern Nigeria, citizens—particularly women or youth—feel unable to approach local government officials and sense that they are being treated unfairly.47 Whilst the Chadian President and his army were in the battlefield combating Boko Haram terrorists with the view to bringing peace to Nigeria and sub Sahel Africa, Nigeria's wicked and incredibly corrupt selfish rulers are busy looting the treasury dry in the name distributing funds as palliative for the Corona virus. What a wicked regime . But it is clear the two share a like-minded ideology. Boko Haram has been pressed against, and pushed back, and limited. But there [is] evidence that some of those fighters are now assisting the Fulani
More than half of the 815 million undernourished people in the world live in countries struggling with conflict, violence and fragility, Nigeria being one of them. One conclusion that could be drawn from this detailed study is that the Boko Haram crisis is weighing heavily on Nigeria's future by compromising food security and nutrition 43 DFID Nigeria, “Conflict Management in Northeast Nigeria,” https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300309.On 7 October in Damaturu, Yobe at least 15 people were killed by 3 suicide bombers. In Goniri, Yobe 7 soldiers and over 100 militants were killed, and a large arms cache was found, according to an army spokesman, who said that the recent apparent rise in suicide bombings was an indication of the success of military operations.
54 Chitra Nagarajan, “Civilian Perceptions of the Yan Gora (CJTF) in Borno State, Nigeria,” Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2018, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018.06.CJTF-Report.Africa-Program.Web_..pdf. Boko- Haram has been shown to be far more violent than MEND. Sources: ACLED, GADM (Global Administrative Areas), Esri World, African Flood and Drought Monitor, Harvard Oil and Gas, AAPG database, Peace Research Institute Oslo. Projection: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 31N: Shawn Snow, April 2015. Nigeria: Conflict Analysis- The Rise of Boko Haram.
In the long run, however, these bottom-up approaches face institutional hurdles that go beyond the immediate impact of conflict. Comparative research on donor-induced participatory interventions at the local level indicates that such programs work best if they are supported by a responsive state—if “higher-level institutions of accountability function well and communities have the capacity to effectively monitor service providers and others in charge of public resources,” as Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao write.126 However, across Nigeria, local governments suffer from major accountability shortcomings. On paper, they are meant to be run by elected councils and to serve as the primary interface between citizens and the state. In practice, many states have not held local government elections in years. In the northeast in particular, governors have used insecurity to justify repeated delays. Instead, they have preferred to put in place appointed caretaker chairmen who are political allies, often with a statutory six-month term of office. Borno State, for example, has held only two local elections since the end of the military dictatorship in 1999, one in 2003 and another in 2008.127Yet on the ground, several factors have stood in the way of closer collaboration. First, the region lacks an effective political infrastructure. It is divided between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which includes Niger and Nigeria, and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), which includes Chad and Cameroon. A history of interstate conflict—while not as devastating as the region’s civil wars—exacerbates these divisions. The Lake Chad Basin Commission, which formally hosts the Multinational Joint Task Force, lacks funding and capacity, and has little experience dealing with peace and security issues. Its capacity to manage a conflict response operation of this scale has therefore been doubted from the outset.78 MAIDUGURI, Nigeria (AP) — Nigeria's military says soldiers have killed at least 16 Boko Haram extremists after an attack in the country's northern Borno state. Col. Onyema Nwachukwu, Deputy Director Army Public Relations, said Sunday that insurgents in three vehicles, including gun trucks, on Friday attacked the Mairari area village of Monguno
Boko Haram, (Hausa: “Westernization Is Sacrilege”)byname of Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād (Arabic: “People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad”), from 2015 also called Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) or Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP), Islamic sectarian movement, founded in 2002 by Muhammed Yusuf in northeastern Nigeria, that since 2009 has carried out assassinations and large-scale acts of violence in that country. The group’s initial proclaimed intent was to uproot the corruption and injustice in Nigeria, which it blamed on Western influences, and to impose Sharīʿah, or Islamic law. Later the group vowed to avenge the deaths of Yusuf and other group members, who were killed by security forces in 2009. In 2015 the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and took the name Islamic State (or State’s) West African Province (ISWAP; also known as Islamic State in West Africa, or ISWA). The next year the group split, with one faction retaining that name and the other reverting back to the original appellation.21 Toby Lanzer, “The Lake Chad Basin: An Overlooked Crisis,” Humanitarian Exchange no. 70, October 2017, https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/he-70-web.pdf. Boko Haram's 11-year-old campaign has claimed tens of thousands of lives in northeast Nigeria and driven nearly two million people from their homes. Separately, in Niger, the defence ministry in Niamey said its armed forces, in a joint operation with Chad, had inflicted heavy losses on Boko Haram in the lake region Introduction. In 2019, the conflict in northeastern Nigeria entered its eleventh year. Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency and the government's military response have killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced millions across the Lake Chad region, which straddles Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria
Read the latest news about Boko Haram. Get breaking news updates on Boko Haram in Nigeria and the world today 18th May 2020 In February 2013, Boko Haram was responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in the far north of Cameroon. In November 2013, Boko Haram members kidnapped a French priest in Cameroon. In December 2013, Boko Haram gunmen reportedly attacked civilians in several areas of northern Cameroon. Security forces from Chad and Niger also reportedly partook in skirmishes against suspected Boko Haram members along Nigeria's borders. In 2013, the group also kidnapped eight French citizens in northern Cameroon and obtained ransom payments for their release.At the same time, the conflict has weakened the authority of traditional and religious leaders, who have historically played central dispute resolution roles. Many left their communities during the conflict; others were deliberately targeted by insurgents for refusing to collaborate. Some community elders have also seen their authority challenged by youth militia formed during the conflict. Together, these developments have created a local leadership vacuum at a time when the risk of land and property-related conflict is particularly high.40 Disruptions in grazing routes and decreases in arable land have exacerbated conflicts between farmers and herders, while protracted displacement has caused friction between internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and host communities.
. Forty-eight men and boys were killed on the 1st at one mosque in Kukawa. Seventeen were wounded in the attack. Ninety-seven others, mostly men, were killed in numerous mosques on the 2nd with a number of women and young girls killed in their homes. An unknown number were wounded. As well as extortion from local residents, Boko Haram has claimed to extort money from local state governments. A spokesman of Boko Haram claimed that Kano state governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi state governor Isa Yuguda had paid them monthly. On 28 August, the Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari, retracted the military's statement and claimed that the Boko Haram leader was 'wounded' but not killed in the air-strike. Over the past two years, several civilian agencies have become more involved in the process, particularly the Office of the National Security Adviser. In December 2017, the Nigerian government adopted an initial Action Plan for Demobilization, Dissociation, Reintegration, and Reconciliation targeting suspected Boko Haram members, and it is now working in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration to integrate this plan into the existing Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.149 Since 2017, USAID has been authorized to rely on vetting conducted by Nigerian security forces under Operation Safe Corridor to support women and children affiliated with Boko Haram who have been designated as low risk.
In the early years of the crisis, international donors lacked a clear regional approach to the crisis. The U.S. government, for example, proceeded primarily on bilateral lines, with the aim of targeting the unique vulnerabilities of each of the Lake Chad countries. Only as the conflict expanded and as the government of Goodluck Jonathan proved to be an unwilling partner did donors’ focus shift to a regional response. The U.S. government created or adapted various structures to better coordinate U.S. activities across countries, including USAID’s West Africa Regional CVE Unit (based in Accra) and an interagency coordination structure within the State Department headed by a senior coordinator on Boko Haram, established in 2015. These initiatives proved fairly successful in ensuring greater alignment and better information-sharing between agencies.77. Insufficient coordination between security actors often resulted in delayed and heavy-handed responses to local security threats—a problem not unique to the northeast, but prevalent across Nigeria.38 The insurgency dramatically exacerbated these challenges. The military’s inability to protect civilians in the early years of the conflict generated widespread resentment. Communities accused security forces of targeting the population, collaborating with the insurgents, and prolonging the fighting for financial gain. As Boko Haram has been pushed back, relations between citizens and security forces have improved in some localities. Yet fear and mistrust are still pervasive, and civilians often prefer turning to community militia—such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)—for protection.39
Stigmatization affects not only former combatants but also relatives of suspected fighters, women and girls abducted by Boko Haram, those who were living in Boko Haram–controlled areas, as well as children born out of forced marriages within the group.53 As a result, there is a high risk that the return of former Boko Haram members could cause new tensions, and that some returnees could even return to violence if they struggle to find acceptance. The same risk surrounds local vigilante groups: while they are generally celebrated for providing protection to civilians during the height of the crisis, communities now worry about the likelihood of future violence associated with their politicization, turn to criminality, and intergroup rivalries.54126 Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, Localizing Development: Does Participation Work? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), 11.Boko Haram's proclamation that it has established an Islamic caliphate has stoked global fears over the insurgents' rapid ascent in Africa's most populous country ahead of the February 2015 national elections. Campbell, however, warns U.S. policymakers to resist characterizing Boko Haram as simply another foe in the global war on terrorism, since the group's grievances are primarily local.On Friday, the African Union endorsed the creation of a regional force of more than 8,000 troops to combat the group. However, the force's remit will be limited to securing the Nigerian side of Lake Chad, rather than pushing further into Nigeria.
Boko Haram was founded upon the principles of Salafism which advocates strict adherence to Sharia law. It developed into a Jihadist group in 2009. The movement is diffuse, and fighters who are associated with it follow the Salafi doctrine. Their beliefs tend to be centered on strict adherence to Wahabism, which is an extremely strict form of Sunni Islam that sees many other forms of Islam as idolatrous. The group has denounced the members of the Sufi and the Shiite sects as infidels. Boko Haram seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria. It opposes the Westernization of Nigerian society and the concentration of the wealth of the country among members of a small political elite, mainly in the Christian south of the country. Nigeria is Africa's biggest economy, but 60% of its population of 173 million (as of 2013) live on less than $1 a day. The sharia law imposed by local authorities, beginning with Zamfara in January 2000 and covering 12 northern states by late 2002, may have promoted links between Boko Haram and political leaders, but was considered by the group to have been corrupted.:101 More than 1000000 free essays.  The group is also known for attacking Christian churches.  The movement, whose name in the Hausa language, Boko Haram, translates as Western education is sacrilege or a sin, is divided into three factions, and in 2011, was responsible for more than 450 killings in Nigeria. 9] Though the group first became known internationally. This video is unavailable. Watch Queue Queue. Watch Queue Queu Increases in Western military assistance—despite a lack of clear commitment on the side of Nigerian authorities to investigate and prosecute cases of high-level military corruption and abuse—have sent a conflicting message to the Nigerian government. While in the early years of the crisis, evidence of human rights abuses by Nigerian military units did impede U.S. assistance in particular, the United States has proven more willing to sidestep these concerns under President Muhammadu Buhari’s leadership. For example, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration in April 2017 decided to reactivate the sale of twelve A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to Nigeria—a deal that had been stalled due to human rights concerns. Yet Buhari’s government so far has done little to prosecute anyone involved in the widespread human rights violations that occurred and continue to occur in the northeast; nor have the army and air force taken tangible steps to improve transparency. So far, Nigeria’s Western partners have not made continued training and equipment transfers contingent on broader efforts to improve the military’s human rights deficiencies and accountability.Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published reports in 2012 that were widely quoted by government agencies and the media, based on research conducted over the course of the conflict in the worst affected areas of the country. The NGOs were critical of both security forces and Boko Haram. HRW stated "Boko Haram should immediately cease all attacks, and threats of attacks, that cause loss of life, injury, and destruction of property. The Nigerian government should take urgent measures to address the human rights abuses that have helped fuel the violent militancy". According to the 2012 US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices:
Programs focused on strengthening community security through dialogue mechanisms, peace clubs, and early warning systems have generally worked best among local actors who are close to the issues at hand. For example, the British-funded NSRP found that local-level platforms that brought together LGA officials, religious leaders, traditional authorities, community members, and formal and informal security forces to discuss and respond to local security threats achieved the greatest impact in terms of conflict prevention and response, especially compared to similar platforms at the state and federal level.86 Such community mechanisms have proven particularly effective if they are broadly inclusive, convene regularly, reach the right government and security stakeholders, and are adequately prepared.87 In some localities, for example, they were able to reduce tensions between host communities and IDPs, address cattle rustling, and draw up local agreements to prevent clashes between farmers and herders, thereby contributing to a reduction in violence.88Donors have made progress in restoring basic infrastructure and services, yet political end goals remain uncertain. As the military made progress against Boko Haram in 2015 and 2016, some donors focused on rapidly bringing back civilian government structures to newly liberated areas. Yet it quickly became clear that these small-scale efforts were insufficient to address long-standing perceptions of government neglect, particularly in a context of ongoing crisis. As a result, USAID decided to shift toward a more targeted approach, which focuses on competing with violent extremist groups by directly providing services to individuals and communities deemed at risk of recruitment. This approach, while enabling greater flexibility and potential short-term gains, does not necessarily work toward a clearly defined political end state.It came as Nigerian officials dismissed Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance to Islamic State as a reaction to military pressure from Nigeria and its allies.
Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist group from northeastern Nigeria, ﬁrst announced itself on the Nigerian stage in 2009, following a riot in Maiduguri that killed over 800 people. 2 The group's founder and then leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed while in police custody. The kidnapping of 276 girls at Government Secondary School Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria, on 14 April 2014 has brought into international prominence the organization Jama'atu Ahlis Suna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad or Boko Haram. This incident heralded a new trajectory in Boko Haram's tactics and strategies We quantify the impact of the Boko Haram conflict on education in North-East Nigeria. • Individual panel fixed-effects results indicate that conflict reduces school enrolment. • Negative effect is larger for individuals who are no longer of mandatory school age. • We show that exposure to conflict reduces years of education completed Many of these stabilization programs were designed with the underlying assumption that the security situation would continue to improve, thereby facilitating the return of displaced populations and local government. For many donors, the overarching objective was to help Nigerian civil and military authorities re-establish a government presence in recaptured areas and begin the programming aimed at preparing the ground for longer-term recovery and development. Yet in reality, Nigeria’s overstretched and corruption-plagued military has struggled to consolidate its gains. Over the past year, security has again worsened in parts of Borno State, thereby preventing the scale-up of many programs. While the Nigerian government has been eager to demonstrate progress in reconstruction, donors point to the longer-term threat of ISWAP gaining a greater foothold in the rural areas around Lake Chad. Local-level programs rely heavily on the theory that they will create “islands of stability” that will eventually forge connections with each other. Yet it is unclear if this assumption holds true in a context of continued insecurity.
Boko Haram is considered a threat to not only Nigeria but also the entire world. In 2012, then-Commander of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Carter Ham, voiced concerns about the intent. A video later emerged of alleged security forces ordering people they suspected of being Boko Haram members to lie on the ground before shooting them dead. Around 800 people were killed in this round of violence.Perhaps the most significant challenge has been to bridge gaps between different levels of governance, and ensure higher-level political responsiveness to local mechanisms. Programs designed to improve communication flows between communities, LGAs, and the state government found that issues that went beyond the capacity of community leaders were not always fed into higher-level discussions. If they were, state-level forums often failed to communicate their feedback or responses to security concerns. “As opposed to the intended design, issues are not cascading across the levels,” found one evaluation. “Actors mostly provide individual responses according to their mandates. . . . Many of the community observers interviewed do not get feedback from the LGA and State level rungs.”9471 Murtala and Abubakar, “State Governance and Coordination of the Humanitarian Response in North-East Nigeria.”
Boko Haram’s attacks persisted into 2014, particularly in the northeast, as the group raided villages and terrorized and murdered civilians with increasing frequency. The group also killed hundreds of people by detonating bombs in large towns and cities, including Abuja. Boko Haram continued to target schools, such as in the February attack on a college in Yobe state where some 50 male students were killed and the college was virtually destroyed. The group drew worldwide condemnation after it perpetrated a mass kidnapping of more than 275 girls from a boarding school in Chibok in Borno state in April, which generated an increase in offers of international assistance to Nigeria as the country attempted to quell Boko Haram’s acts of terror. In May the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on individuals in Boko Haram, freezing assets and issuing travel bans and an arms embargo. However, given the group’s informal structure, the sanctions had no discernible effect on Boko Haram’s operations. The group continued its attacks and expanded the territory it occupied. In August 2014 Boko Haram declared the area under its control to be an Islamic state. Boko Haram is a militant terrorist organization whose goal is to overthrow the government of Nigeria and institute Sharia law. Nigeria is characterized by two areas defined by wealth: the poor north and the rich south. It is no surprise that Boko Haram operates in northern Nigeria, where it can capitalize on poor economic conditions to recruit new members
Increasingly concerned about Boko Haram’s threat to regional stability, the United States as well as France and the UK began shifting their focus to Nigeria’s neighbors. Various U.S. agencies began pushing for greater military cooperation between the Lake Chad countries, and the United States leveraged the Global Security Cooperation Fund and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund to increase security assistance to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.12 This shift allowed the U.S. government to support military efforts against Boko Haram while circumventing the policy hurdles associated with direct aid to the Nigerian government. In parallel, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched several smaller-scale stabilization efforts aimed at increasing community resilience to violent extremism in the wider Lake Chad region.13In late 2013, Amnesty International received 'credible' information that over 950 inmates had died in custody, mostly in detention centres in Maiduguri and Damaturu, within the first half of the year. Official state corruption was also documented in December 2013 by the UK Home Office: Boko Haram, a militant group based in Nigeria's northwestern states of Yobe and Borno, claimed responsibility. Boko Haram is the popular title for a group that calls itself Jama`at ahl al-sunna li-da`wa wa-l-qital, and it has operated in Nigeria since 2002-2003
John Campbell Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies On 17 January, 6 Nigerian soldiers were killed and 14 injured by the Boko Haram jihadists during a raid at a village near the army chief's family home. Four military vehicles were also seized by the jihadists and two were completely destroyed. In April 2014, attackers raided Chibok deep in northeastern Nigeria and kidnapped 276 school girls, generally between 16 and 18 years old. 219 remain missing. Shekau claimed credit for the kidnappings in a video and threatened to sell them.57 U.S. Stabilization Assistance Review; and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” May 2018, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-48-LL.pdf.144 Omar S. Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani, “Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods,” Institute for Security Studies, July 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf.
The NPF [Nigeria Police Force], SSS, and military report to civilian authorities; however, these security services periodically act outside of civilian control. The government lack effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. The NPF remain susceptible to corruption, commit human rights abuses, and generally operate with impunity in the apprehension, illegal detention, and sometimes execution of criminal suspects. The SSS also commit human rights abuses, particularly in restricting freedom of speech and press. In some cases private citizens or the government brought charges against perpetrators of human rights abuses in these units. However, most cases lingered in court or went unresolved after an initial investigation.103 Sigar, “Stabilization: Lessons Learned From the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” 140.Despite historic ties, al-Qaeda central has never officially accepted Boko Haram as an affiliate. The issues between AQ and Boko Haram related to the extremism of Abubakar Shekau with respect to him declaring the entire general population of Muslims in Nigeria to be non-Muslims. Shekau argues that due to the widespread apostasy of Muslims through voting in elections that it is legitimate to kill Muslim civilians. Al-Qaeda takes the view that the general population should be viewed as Muslim and thus killing civilians is not acceptable. Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War Paperback - March 30, 2016 M.J. Smith takes readers inside the violence and provides the first in-depth account of the conflict. He traces Boko Haram from its beginnings as a small Islamist sect in Nigeria's remote northeast, led by a baby-faced but charismatic preacher, to its transformation into a.
IS took control of large swathes of territory in eastern Syria and across northern and western Iraq last year.37 See, for example, “UK Aid, “Final Evaluation Report: Independent Evaluation Provider to the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme,” November 2017, http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/25184166.pdf, 5.First, across the northeast, international donors have identified restoring local-level conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms as a central priority. While programs vary in their design, they are based on the basic theory of change that supporting communities to better articulate their concerns and needs to government officials and security agencies—and training the latter to listen to these concerns—will help ensure more effective responses to local-level threats, build popular trust in security forces, and help manage future tensions and shocks.37 Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria Roman Loimeier Abstract: Since 2009, the radical Muslim movement in northern Nigeria known as Boko Haram has become widely known in Western media for both its militant actions and its ultra-fundamentalist programme. This analy-sis examines Boko Haram from a historical perspective, viewing the move
Except for a brief period of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria was governed by a series of military dictatorships from 1966 until the advent of democracy in 1999. Ethnic militancy is thought to have been one of the causes of the 1967–1970 civil war; religious violence reached a new height in 1980 in Kano, the largest city in the north of the country, where the Muslim fundamentalist sect Yan Tatsine ("followers of Maitatsine") instigated riots that resulted in four or five thousand deaths. In the ensuing military crackdown, Maitatsine was killed, fuelling a backlash of increased violence that spread across other northern cities over the next twenty years. Social inequality and poverty contributed both to the Maitatsine and Boko Haram uprisings.:97–98 42 UNDP, “Accelerating Development Investments in Famine Response and Prevention: Case Study North-East Nigeria,” 2017, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/UNDP_FamineStudy_Nigeria.PDF.The advantage of this shift is that it allows political nimbleness: rather than being tied to the Nigerian government’s timeline for returning civilian administration and services, the program can adjust quickly based on changing conflict dynamics, and reach more remote and vulnerable communities. However, these efforts have little connection to local- or state-level governance, and thus are not clearly working toward a defined political end state. As such, they may be contributing to community resilience in the short run, without directly addressing the deficiencies in local governance that have characterized the region.After its founding in 2002, Boko Haram's increasing radicalisation led to the suppression operation by the Nigerian military forces and the summary execution of its leader Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009. Its unexpected resurgence, following a mass prison break in September 2010, was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks, initially against soft targets, but progressing in 2011 to include suicide bombings of police buildings and the United Nations office in Abuja. The government's establishment of a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover the entire northeast of Nigeria, led to an increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks.
© Copyright Africa Check 2020. Read our republishing guidelines. You may reproduce this piece or content from it for the purpose of reporting and/or discussing news and current events. This is subject to: Crediting Africa Check in the byline, keeping all hyperlinks to the sources used and adding this sentence at the end of your publication: “This report was written by Africa Check, a non-partisan fact-checking organisation. View the original piece on their website", with a link back to this page. Commonly known as Boko Haram, the Islamic State in West Africa is a terrorist organisation based in Northeast Nigeria. Formed in 2002 as Jamā'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihād meaning.
According to the UN Security Council listing of Boko Haram under the al-Qaeda sanctions regime in May 2014, the group "has maintained a relationship with AQIM for training and material support purposes", and "gained valuable knowledge on the construction of improvised explosive devices from AQIM". The UN found that a "number of Boko Haram members fought alongside al Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali in 2012 and 2013 before returning to Nigeria with terrorist expertise". AQIM is one of al-Qaeda's regional branches, whose leader, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, has sworn an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda's senior leadership. There have been accusations of political sponsorship, but little evidence has been offered. At this point the insurgency has evolved into a many-headed monster, beyond the control of any one politician.The group now known as Boko Haram began to emerge in 2003, when a collection of like-minded Islamists retreated to a remote area of the northeast called Kanamma. Here they violently clashed with authorities.
2 “Ministerial Conference on the Adoption of the Regional Stabilization Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin Region,” African Union’s Peace and Security Department, August 31, 2018, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/lake-chad-basin-commission-and-the-african-union-convene-a-ministerial-conference-to-adopt-the-regional-stabilization-strategy-for-the-areas-of-the-lake-chad-basin-region-affected-by-the-activities-of-boko-haram.53 Centre for Democracy and Development, “Prospects for Transitional Justice Initiative in North East Nigeria,” September 2017, http://cddwestafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Transitional-Justice-In-North-East.pdf."Basically he's just trying to create panic to create a plea for help that will not even come because very soon we will see to the end of the insurgency in Nigeria."In addition to these overarching difficulties, international donors funding local-level stabilization programs in the northeast have faced a number of program-specific challenges and dilemmas. Some are far from unique to Nigeria, but instead reflect the inherent difficulties of designing politically smart interventions in a fluid conflict environment. Others are more specific to the Nigerian context. The following section examines these challenges in greater detail, focusing on donor adaptation over time.